Russia’s move toward regulated cryptocurrency trading and cross-border settlement did not remove the intermediaries that can determine whether a payment is usable. Banks, exchanges, stablecoin issuers and redemption providers remained potential points of restriction.
That is the central settlement lesson of an analysis by Liu Honglin of Mankun Blockchain, published by PANews on November 6, 2026, at 13:35 (UTC+8). The article traces Russia’s policy changes and examines what they might mean for China and Hong Kong. The chronology below reflects that publication’s reporting context, not a new announcement.
Why Russia changed its approach
Russia’s central bank warned about Bitcoin in January 2014, citing its lack of backing, speculative pricing and potential involvement in money laundering and terrorist financing. In a consultation report dated January 20, 2022, it proposed prohibiting cryptocurrency issuance, trading and exchange activities in Russia, as well as mining.
The finance ministry favored regulation instead. Ivan Chebeskov, then head of its financial policy department, argued that cryptocurrency trading already existed and that pushing it offshore or underground would make supervision harder. Six days after the central bank’s report, President Vladimir Putin called for the government and central bank to agree on an approach, while noting Russia’s electricity resources and skilled workforce as mining advantages.
Financial sanctions following Russia’s full-scale military action against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, intensified the need for alternative settlement channels. In March 2022, SWIFT disconnected an initial group of seven designated Russian entities and relevant subsidiaries under EU rules, disrupting their access to the interbank messaging network.
Using another national currency did not eliminate banking constraints. According to the Bank of Russia figures cited in the article, the renminbi’s share of Russian export settlements rose from 13% in January 2023 to 35% in September 2023. But foreign banks also tightened their handling of Russian business as sanctions exposure increased.
Reuters reported in April 2024, citing five people familiar with the situation, that some Chinese banks were avoiding Russian transactions over secondary-sanctions concerns. Businesses seeking accounts at VTB’s Shanghai branch faced lengthy waits: one interviewee described two to three months for Chinese suppliers, while one company had reportedly waited six months without opening an account.
Permission for foreign trade—not domestic crypto payments
Russia’s State Duma passed legislation in July 2024 allowing cryptocurrency settlement for foreign trade. The laws were signed in August, with initial activity conducted through central-bank-organized trials that limited participants and duration.
In December 2024, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said Russian businesses were already using Bitcoin and other digital currencies for international payments, including Bitcoin mined domestically.
Mining also acquired formal reporting obligations. The Federal Tax Service launched a registration service in November 2024. From 2025, miners were required to report production and wallet identifiers electronically by the 20th day of the following month, including relevant addresses used through mining pools.
The source describes a further expansion under the Digital Currency and Digital Rights Law, effective in September 2026. Residents gained channels to trade through regulated domestic institutions, while importers and exporters received broader scope for cross-border cryptocurrency payments. The prohibition on using cryptocurrency to pay for domestic goods and services remained.
According to the central bank’s explanation cited in the article, ordinary non-qualified investors who passed a test could buy up to 300,000 rubles of highly liquid cryptocurrency annually through each intermediary. Overseas trading, transfers abroad and tax reporting remained subject to specified requirements.
On October 6, 2026, the central bank announced that the first five digital custodians and four cryptocurrency exchange institutions had entered its registers. Those institutions had until September 2027 to align their operations with the new law.
Garantex exposed USDT’s issuer-control layer
The Garantex case illustrates why moving funds onto a blockchain does not necessarily remove the ability to freeze them.
Garantex was initially registered in Estonia but conducted its principal operations in Moscow and St. Petersburg. It lost its Estonian virtual-asset service license and was sanctioned by the United States in 2022, yet continued operating.
In March 2025, a coordinated enforcement action targeted the platform. US authorities seized associated domains, German and Finnish authorities seized servers, and the US Justice Department announced charges against two managers. Prosecutors alleged that Garantex had processed at least $96 billion in cryptocurrency transactions since 2019 and accused its operators of money laundering and sanctions violations.
Tether subsequently said it had assisted the US Secret Service in freezing $23 million connected with Garantex transactions.
Those funds were held in USDT. As the token’s issuer, Tether can use its control mechanisms to restrict transfers involving relevant addresses. The practical distinction is important: a holder may possess tokens on-chain but still be unable to transfer or use them after an issuer freeze.
A ruble-linked token introduced different dependencies
According to an August 2025 US Treasury sanctions determination cited by the article, people associated with Garantex moved customers and funds to successor platform Grinex and used the ruble-backed A7A5 token to facilitate the transition of customer balances.
A7A5 was issued by Kyrgyzstan’s Old Vector. The ownership relationships of associated cross-border settlement company A7 involved Russian bank Promsvyazbank and businessman Ilan Shor.
Switching from a dollar stablecoin to a ruble-backed token did not resolve every settlement problem. As the author explains, overseas sellers still had to accept the token, and users needed sufficient conversion channels.
The EU’s nineteenth sanctions package in October 2025 targeted A7A5 and related institutions and prohibited transactions involving the stablecoin within the EU. The article reports that the United States designated the A7 network as a sanctioned transnational criminal organization in October 2026. FinCEN also proposed additional transaction restrictions; those restrictions were still a proposal at the time described.
Hong Kong’s alternative: licensed issuance and explicit redemption duties
The article contrasts Russia’s experience with Hong Kong’s regulated stablecoin framework. It reports that the Hong Kong Monetary Authority issued its first stablecoin issuer licenses to Anchorpoint Financial and The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation on April 10, 2026. Both initially planned Hong Kong dollar stablecoins and identified cross-border payments as a business direction.
For a business, receiving a token is not necessarily the end of settlement. It may still need to convert that token into local currency to pay suppliers and employees. An interruption in conversion or redemption can leave a token balance unavailable for those expenses.
Hong Kong’s reserve and redemption requirements assign responsibilities to licensed issuers; they do not make stablecoins risk-free. The author also notes that Hong Kong dollar stablecoins remain connected to the currency’s linked exchange rate system and banking infrastructure.
The article’s policy argument is that regulated experimentation could help build additional payment options before existing channels become constrained. It is not a claim that such arrangements would be immune to sanctions. For mainland-linked business and repatriation of funds, mainland regulatory requirements would still apply.
Russia’s experience therefore points to a narrower conclusion than unrestricted crypto adoption: alternative settlement channels can change the route a payment takes, but issuers, counterparties, conversion providers and regulators can still determine whether its recipient can ultimately use the money.
Source: Original PANews article, by Liu Honglin, Mankun Blockchain. Published November 6, 2026, at 13:35 (UTC+8).